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Singleton baby boy Lars is born at 25 weeks gestation. He
weighs 523 g and his mother did not receive antenatal
glucocorticoid. Although the online calculator http://
www.nichd.nih.gov/about/org/cdbpm/pp/prog_epbo/epbo
_case.cfm (based on ref (1) predicts a 90% chance of ‘death
or moderate to severe neurodevelopmental impairment’,
Lars survives just fine and makes it to high school age with-
out any developmental problem whatsoever. He just hap-
pens to be that one out of ten.
Does not this remind you of those familiar stories of great
grandfathers who smoked for their entire lives and lived to
see their great grandchildren getting married? How can this
be, with tobacco smoking being associated with a two to
fourfold increased mortality risk, adjusted for social status
(2)?
The educated reader will readily agree that I am confusing
individual and population risk here. Maybe I also mingle
inappropriately those general concepts that reach beyond
the medical context, i.e. prediction in individuals and in
populations? How are risk and prediction defined in the
first place, and how understood?
Tricky issues, indeed. In what follows, I offer a few brief
thoughts about these concepts, zooming in on the bio-
medical sciences context.
RISK
You can measure the baby’s weight and length, and the
number of days she spent in the hospital. You can also mea-
sure her blood concentration of C-reactive protein and her
urinary output. But you cannot measure her risk of, say,
developing cerebral palsy, however defined. Risk is a
parameter, something beyond measurement.
Although immeasurable, the concept of risk is deeply
entrenched in everyone’s perception of the dangers
(perceived or real) of everyday life (3). So is our desire to
quantify it. Bankers crunch numbers, performing ‘risk
assessments’ before breaking the deal. Business decisions
are governed by ‘risk–benefit ratios’. In biomedical research,
risk-factor epidemiology (4) is deemed a black box by some
(5) and defended by others (6).
Quantitative risk perception varies as widely as does the
interpretation of likelihoods in general. While the ‘chance
of showers’ announced in the radio forecast might prompt
one person to carry an umbrella all day, it might lead
another not to consider this a worthwhile effort. Of course,
it all depends on your definition of ‘chance’, which some
might interpret as meaning ‘highly likely’, while others think
‘close to zero’. Another nonlinguistic point here is: what is
at stake? Would you travel to that remote corner of the
world if the chance of acquiring the swine flu is 5%? Maybe
yes. Would you jump out of the airplane if you knew there
was a 5% chance the parachute might not open? Maybe
not. Would you reject that null hypothesis if the chance of
being wrong was 5%? Absolutely! For more on the question,
‘Why 5%?’, see reference (7).
Bottom line is, it is impossible to apply probabilities to
individuals. It is what theoreticians might call a ‘category
error’. Miettinen pointedly asserts that ‘risk is inherently a
theoretical, nonempirical entity … (that) refers to individu-
als (of a given kind)’ (8) (emphasis Miettinen’s). Just as one
cannot equate laboratory rats and human patients, one can-
not equate the incidence of an event in populations [what
von Mises calls ‘the collective’ (9)] to the risk of this event in
individuals. Yes, we do it all the time, by drawing a parallel,
Article in the series A Different View are edited by Alan Leviton
(alan.leviton@childrens.harvard.edu).
Acta Pædiatrica ISSN 0803–5253
ª2009 The Author/Journal Compilation ª2009 Foundation Acta Pædiatrica/Acta Pædiatrica 2009 98, pp. 1093–1095 1093
an inference. But sometimes, we need to be reminded that
we might do this at the cost of making irrational decisions.
Yes, airplanes do indeed crash, albeit rarely. We all are
very familiar with those nasty thoughts that linger in the
back of our minds when our palms begin to sweat at takeoff.
Want some numbers? When data were gathered from 3306
air line pilots, 66 crashes were documented in a total of 12.9
million flight hours (10). This translates into 22.3 years you
have to be in the air 24 ⁄7 (current lingo for ‘all the time’) to
experience one crash. In essence, if you fly during office
hours only (8 h per day, 5 days a week) you will experience
one crash in 93 years. Here is the point: sometimes, it is our
inferences (and sometimes anxieties) that go wild, not our
science.
PREDICTABILITY
Most scientific research aims at an improved understanding
of the facts. One reason we want to understand better is to
be able to predict whether a certain event will occur or
whether some intervention will be successful or not. Indeed,
most research is evaluated in a rather pragmatic way, by
assessing to what extent its conclusions stand the test of
time by allowing for successful predictions.
As I alluded in the section on risk above, predicting the
future of individual life trajectories is usually based on prob-
abilistic population estimates. The concepts underlying
most prediction research reach far back into the philosophy
of science – deep into the sticky mess of ‘causation in an
indeterministic world’ (11).
The reason risk factor epidemiologists seek to identify
risk factors of outcomes is to learn about the causal frame-
work of such outcomes, which in turn enables them to pre-
vent their occurrence. Thus, they often make assumptions
that attribute causal powers to observed risk factors. This is
just fine, but I happen to agree with David Savitz, that ‘cau-
sal inference is just that – an inference by the interpreter of
the data, not a product of the study or something that is
found within the evidence generated by the study’ [(12),
p20].
This latter statement might be a surprise to those who
strongly believe in the explanatory powers of (here: biomed-
ical) research. Is not this exactly what research and science
are supposed to provide, i.e. proof that smoking does cause
lung cancer or that drug X does cure disease Y?
Alas, was it that simple. Those who always thought this to
be the case should brace themselves for yet another quote
from Savitz: ‘The cliche´ that epidemiologic studies generate
only measures of association, not causation is meaningless
… even experiments just generate measures of associations
as well’. [(12), p21]. Wow!
A reviewer of one of my manuscripts made it clear that
she ⁄he had a problem with the statement that ‘x predicted y’
in the context of odd ratios. The reviewer was convinced
that ‘this statement … is not accurate. As discussed above,
… (the data) DO NOT indicate that X predicts Y in any clin-
ically useful way. Increased odds and predictability are not
synonymous’ (emphasis hers ⁄his). Some of this criticism
revolved around this reviewer’s desire to have predictive
values in addition to odds ratios. Our counter-point is that
as much as predictive values may seem intuitive, they are
misleading, precisely because they offer the illusion of pre-
dictability! Instead, all they really do is give the percentage
of Y among those with X – no comparison group, no adjust-
ments made. I am inclined to say that instead of accepting
such illusion of predictability, I would rather go with real
associations.
NEO-PRAGMATISM: A VERY DIFFERENT VIEW
If all I have said above were true, would it not boil down to
the notion that causation cannot be established, and in the
same vein, that prediction cannot be achieved? Indeed, that
is what I am trying to sell in this article as a view different
from the perspective often taken by both clinicians and
researchers alike: that absolute proof is possible outside
formal logic, that clinical trials infallibly establish the
efficacy of medical interventions, and that the perfect
prediction of a patient’s future is possible given enough
valid information.
To the contrary, I believe that such thinking is absolutely
(oops!) inadequate. It simply does not matter whether an
observed link between some exposure and outcome is called
‘causation’ or ‘association’ (13). Similarly, it simply does not
matter whether you say that ‘smoking is associated with
lung cancer’ or ‘smoking predicts lung cancer’. What does
matter is that identifying, and then removing or reducing
predictors from populations can improve the human condi-
tion. This neo-pragmatist position deliberately works
towards an abandonment of appearance-reality distinc-
tions, a replacement of notions of truth with notions of
hope, and a clearer distinction between more useful and less
useful ideas how to create a better future (14).
I know I am not alone (15). However, I am also aware
that such neo-pragmatic views about causation and inter-
vention inspired by an anti-dualist perspective might cause
your eyebrows to rise. However, I still hold that finding per-
fect predictors of your favourite health outcome is an elu-
sive goal. I invite all opponents of this view to speak up and
offer their perspective.
Although perhaps a nice dream, it remains a dream. Sur-
vivors like healthy Lars, the 25-weeker, and that chain
smoking great grandfather, are not a miracle. They are just
perfect examples of how complex and unpredictable natural
developmental trajectories are. And now, I encourage all
believers in predictability to wake up and face the chal-
lenges of the indeterministic world of biomedicine!
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